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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel approach, called
SENATUS, for joint traffic anomaly detection and root-cause
analysis. Inspired from the concept of a senate, the key idea of the
proposed approach is divided into three stages: election, voting
and decision. At the election stage, a small number of senator
flows are chosen to represent approximately the total (usually
huge) set of traffic flows. In the voting stage, anomaly detection
is applied on the senator flows and the detected anomalies are
correlated to identify the most possible anomalous time bins.
Finally in the decision stage, a machine learning technique is
applied to the senator flows of each anomalous time bin to find
the root cause of the anomalies. We evaluate SENATUS using
traffic traces collected from the Pan European network, GEANT,
and compare against another approach which detects anomalies
using lossless compression of traffic histograms. We show the
effectiveness of SENATUS in diagnosing anomaly types: network
scans and DoS/DDoS attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
New applications, emerging every year or even every day,
have made it imperative to investigate effective techniques that
can extract communication patterns from Internet traffic for
security management. Among others, identifying anomalous
events such as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, distributed DoS
(DDoS) attacks and network scans is a crucial task.
A key challenge in traffic anomaly detection is the curse
of dimensionality, which refers to the problems that arise
when analyzing and organizing data in a high-dimensional
space. For example, in a pan-European network, the GEANT
network, it was recorded (even after traffic sampling) that there
were around 109 flows distributed over 216 ports and 232 IP
addresses over a 15-minute time interval on a link. They are
formidable numbers for analysis in traffic anomaly detection.
In addition, in order to identify the possible root cause of
traffic anomaly on a time interval, correlating analysis on
different traffic features, e.g. source Autonomous System (AS)
and destination port number, is often necessary. This implies
that the analysis will have to even deal with those numbers in a
combinatorial manner, which further complicates the analysis
making it hardly implementable.
In the literature, an extensive body of prior work for traffic
anomaly detection exists (e.g. see [1],[2],[3],[4]). In these
works, unusual abrupt variations in traffic time series, defined
as traffic anomalies, raise alarms. Unfortunately, the practical
usefulness of the reported alarms is often limited [5], [3],
mainly due to the tremendous amount of time and effort
additionally required to analyze the root cause of the reported
alarms [3]. This results in a pressing need for approaches that
perform anomaly detection and root cause analysis jointly.
To address the above problems, we propose a novel ap-
proach, called SENATUS, in this paper. It conducts root-
cause analysis jointly with traffic anomaly detection through
traffic aggregation and lossy compression. Specifically, SEN-
ATUS detects time intervals where anomalous events are
suspicious to occur, identifies suspicious aggregate flows, and
diagnoses the type of anomaly. The targeted anomaly types
are DoS/DDoS attacks and network scans or simply scans.
In brief, SENATUS operates in three stage: election, voting,
and decision. Inspired from the concept of a senate, a key
idea and the starting point of the proposed approach is to
choose or elect a small number of traffic flow sets (termed
as senator flows) to represent the total (usually huge) set
of traffic flows. Then, on the elected senator flows, traffic
anomaly detection is applied, whose results for a time bin
together decide or vote if the time bin may be considered as
anomalous. Finally, root cause analysis is conducted on each
anomalous time bin to identify the root cause of anomaly type
for that time bin. The performance of SENATUS is evaluated
using traffic traces collected from GEANT, and compared with
another histogram-based approach.
The techniques proposed to use in the three stages of
SENATUS are, respectively, K-sparse approximation of traffic
histogram [6], Principal Component Pursuit (PCP) [7], and
random tree (RT) machine learning classification [8]. These
techniques, together with the heuristics proposed in the paper
for using them, form the novelty of SENATUS. The specific
contributions are as follows: (i) Instead of performing analysis
directly on all flows whose original traffic histograms suffer
from the curse of dimensionality, we propose to use K-sparse
approximation to select only the flow sets whose feature values
are among the top K on the traffic histogram. This forms the
core of the SENATUS election stage to choose senator flows.
(i) SENATUS performs PCP analysis on the time series of each
senator flow to detect time bins with abrupt changes, at the
voting stage. In addition, the detected time bins with abrupt
changes of all senator flows are correlated to flag the most
possible anomalous bins. (iii) SENATUS, at the decision stage,
performs root-cause analysis for each anomalous time bin,
based on the joint application of two intuitive heuristics and a
linear time signature and machine learning-based technique.
The rest is structured as follows. Sec. II provides back-
ground basics and Sec. III gives a detailed introduction of
SENATUS. Sec.s IV and V provide evaluation methodology
and results. Sec. VI discusses the related work. Finally, the
paper is concluded in Sec. VII.
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II. BASICS OF SENATUS
In this section, we describe traffic anomalies and various
techniques used in this paper.
A. Targeted Anomalies
Table I lists the categories of anomalies considered in this
paper and their traffic characteristics.
TABLE I
TARGETED ANOMALY TYPES
Anomaly Type Traffic Characteristics
DoS Small or large sized flows sent from one source AS
(Autonomous System) via one or multiple source
ports to one destination AS on one or multiple
destination ports
DDoS Many small or large sized flows sent from one or
many source AS via one or multiple source ports to
one destination AS on one or multiple destination
ports
Network Scan Many small sized flows sent from one source AS via
one source port to one or many destination AS on
one destination port
Table I implies that anomalies of DoS, DDoS or network
scan type are often carried by small size flows. However, this
may lead to misdetection of anomalies that may be present in
large size flows. We leave this as future work and highlight
that, focusing on small size flows can reduce the risk of
false positives in anomaly detection, because large size flows
frequently involve benign activities such as bandwidth tests,
large file transfers, and high-volume streaming activities [9].
B. Traffic Histogram
The proposed SENATUS approach is a traffic histogram-
based approach. A traffic histogram is the distribution of the
amount of traffic (in number of flows, packets or bytes) over
all possible values of a traffic feature. A feature is a field in
the header of a packet, such as source port, or a function of
some header field values, such as AS numbers [10].
While there are many features that may be analyzed, we
focus in this paper on four features that are source AS (srcAS),
destination AS (dstAS), source port (srcPort) and destination
port (dstPort). This is motivated by traffic characteristics of
the targeted anomaly types as discussed in Table I.
K-sparse approximation is a technique proposed for traffic
histogram compression [6]. It relies on the fact that a traffic
histogram may be highly compressible if it exhibits a power-
law decay when sorted, and consequently, one may use the top
K-feature values to approximate the original traffic histogram.
More formally, consider a traffic histogram X with n
possible distinct feature values (e.g. port 1, port 2, . . . , port n).
Let X ′ ≡ (x′(1), x′(2), ...x′(n)) denote the sorted histogram,
where the coefficients are in the non-increasing order, i.e.
x′(1) ≥ x′(2) ≥ ...x′(n). Suppose that the sorted histogram
decays according to a power law as, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
x′(i) ≤ R · i(−
1
p ) (1)
where R is a normalization constant and 0 < p ≤ 1 is a scaling
parameter. Then, X can be approximated by the first few
“top”-K coefficients, i.e. x′(1), . . . , x′(K), with approximation
error σK upper-bounded by [6]:
σK = ||X ′ −X ′K ||2 ≤ (ps)−
1
2 ·R ·K(−s) (2)
where X ′K has in total n elements defined as
X ′K ≡ (x′(1), . . . , x′(K), 0, . . . , 0)
and s = 1p− 12 . If the decay of the coefficients is rapid, a small
value of K(<< n) can lead to close approximation.
C. Principle Component Pursuit (PCP)
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is a statistical tool for
high-dimensional data analysis and dimensionality reduction.
It basically assumes that the data approximately lie on a low-
dimensional linear subspace. Let X ∈ Rn1×n2 be a matrix
of interest. The essential idea is to decompose X into two
components, normal component N and anomalous component
A, i.e. X = N +A. In the decomposition, the PCA technique
attempts to find the matrix A such that the matrix N = X−A
has the lowest possible rank.
More formally, the structural analysis tries to solve the
following optimization problem:
min
N,A
‖A‖0, subject to X = N +A and rank(N) ≤ k (3)
where rank(N) denotes the rank of a matrix N, ‖ ‖0 denotes
the `0-norm, i.e. the cardinality of the non-zero elements.
This optimization problem is NP-hard [7]. Fortunately,
based on recent advances in optimization theory, it has been
proved that the nuclear norm, i.e, the sum of singular values,
exactly recovers the low rank component N [7] while the `1
norm, i.e, the sum of absolute values, recovers component A
in terms of sign and support with remarkable robustness to the
outliers in comparison to the `2 norm [11].
Accordingly, Eq. (3) can be solved using a convex optimiza-
tion problem called Principal Component Pursuit [7] as:
min
N,A
‖N‖∗ + λ‖A‖1, subject to X = N +A, (4)
where ‖ ‖∗ denotes the nuclear norm, i.e., the sum of the
singular values of the normal matrix, ‖ ‖1 denotes the `1-norm
of the anomalous events matrix A, and λ > 0 is a weighting
parameter.
D. Random Decision Tree
SENATUS uses the random decision tree (RDT) [12] algo-
rithm to find the root cause of anomalies. In fact, RDT is an
ensemble of decision trees. The process for generating a tree
is as follows. First, it starts with a list of features or attributes
from the data set. Then, it generates a tree by randomly
choosing one of the features without using any training data.
The tree stops growing once the height limit is reached. Then,
it uses the training data to update the statistics of each node.
Note that only the leaf nodes need to record the number of
examples of different classes that are classified through the
nodes in the tree. The training data is scanned exactly once
to update the statistics in multiple random trees. The further
explanation of RDT can be found in Section III-C.
III. DETAILED SENATUS APPROACH
As discussed earlier, SENATUS can be divided into three
stages. In this section, we describe all these stages in detail.
A. Election Stage
In this stage, senator flows and senator subspace are defined,
which are used in further analysis in the later stages.
TABLE II
HEURISTICS
Heuristic Definition
H1 Small packet count per flow: # of packets ≤ α
H2 Small byte count per flow: # of bytes ≤ β
The traffic traces are pre-filtered using two heuristic H1 and
H2 defined in Table II. In H1, small size flows are defined as
those flows whose packet counts are not larger than threshold
value α and in H2, small size flows are defined as those flows
whose byte counts are not larger than threshold value β, in
a time bin. A more detailed investigation of the effect of the
threshold values will be presented in Section IV.
After this filtering, for every measurement time bin, K-
sparse approximation is applied to the flow number histogram
of each of the four traffic features (srcAS, dstAS, srcPort,
dstPort) on the time bin. Here, our approach behind pre-
filtering traffic before applying K-sparse approximation is that,
with pre-filtering, it is more likely that an anomalous feature
value is included in the selected top K components.
After K-sparse approximation is applied for a traffic feature
(e.g. srcAS) on a time bin t, K top values of this feature j for
this time bin are obtained. Let Ij(t) denote the set of these K
top values of the feature j on the time bin t. Suppose there
are N time bins in the traffic trace. Let Ij be the consolidation
of these N sets of such feature values, i.e. Ij = Ij(1)∪ · · · ∪
Ij(N).
Then, for every feature j ∈ {srcAS, dstAS, srcPort, dstPort},
if it has a value i in Ij , i.e. i ∈ Ij , this feature value defines
a senator flow or simply senator for the feature j. We remark
that each senator is indeed a flow aggregate in which all flows
have the same feature value.
The senator subspace is a three-dimension flow count
matrix Y (t, ij , j) defined on time t(= 1, . . . , N) and feature
value ij ∈ Ij across all features j ∈ {srcAs, dstAs, srcPort,
dstPort}. Later analysis will be applied on this senator sub-
space.
B. Voting Stage
At this stage, SENATUS analyzes each senator’s time series
using PCP to detect abrupt changes on the time series. The
detected abrupt variations, called votes, are then correlated on
time to identify or vote the most likely anomalous time bins.
For every feature j ∈ {srcAS, dstAS, srcPort, dstPort}, let
X(t, ij) be its traffic amount time series matrix. Specifically,
the element at (t, ij) of X records the number of flows that
have the same feature value ij (e.g. srcPort 80) at time bin t
in the measurement period. Essentially, X(t, ij) = Y (t, ij , j)
with j fixed to be the considered feature.
Applying the PCP technique described in Section II.C to the
time series matrix X , where n1 = n i.e. the number of time
bins in the measurement period and n2 = Ij i.e. the number of
senators from feature j, the corresponding anomalous events
matrix A is obtained. The positive-value elements in the
obtained anomalous events matrices are referred to as votes.
For any time bin t, a feature j (e.g. srcPort) is flagged
anomalous if (at least) one of its values in Ij makes a vote
on this time bin, or in other words, at least one senator time
series of this feature has abrupt variation on t. For the time
bin t, if all features {srcAS, dstAS, srcPort, dstPort } have
been flagged anomalous, this time bin is considered to be an
anomalous time bin.
C. Decision Stage
In this stage, the attempt is made to diagnose the root-cause
for each anomalous time bin. In particular, our objective is to
investigate if the traffic behavior on an anomalous time bin is
due to one of the focused anomaly types listed in Table I.
1) Suspicious Flow Aggregate: Let mj denotes by the car-
dinality or the number of senator members of Ij . In addition,
let a flow aggregate is defined by srcAS, dstAS, srcPort and
dstPort. Then, for the time bin, there are M = msrcAS ×
mdstAS ×msrcPort ×mdstPort such flow aggregates, which
are called suspicious flow aggregates. These combinations
essentially tell that we consider flows that might be originated
from any suspicious source AS at any suspicious port and
target at any suspicious destination AS at any suspicious port.
Note that, for some of these combinations, the number of
flows in the flow aggregate is zero. Such flow aggregates will
be skipped in later analysis. We call the remaining ones the
effective suspicious flow aggregates.
2) Root Cause Analysis: After identifying the set of sus-
picious aggregate flows, we aim to infer the event that has
caused the alarm while flagging the time bin as anomalous.
Let θ1, θ2 and θ3 denote the three thresholds to be used in the
algorithms for classifying if the anomaly type is DDOS, DOS
or network scan respectively.
The root cause analysis algorithm in SENATUS is a
signature-based algorithm. Specifically, for every effective
suspicious flow aggregate, it performs the following:
1) For every dstIP that is included in the dstAS of the
suspicious flow aggregate, find the number of flows that
are destined to this dstIP, regardless of their srcAS,
srcPort or dstPort. Take the maximum of all such
numbers and call it the anomaly intensity. Compare this
intensity with θ1. If the former is greater, output is
DDoS. Otherwise, perform the next.
2) For every {srcIP, dstIP} pair included in the
{srcAS, dstAS} pair of the suspicious flow aggregate,
perform similarly as above: Find the number of flows
that have the same srcIP and dstIP, regardless of their
srcPort or dstPort. Take the maximum of all such
numbers. Compare this with θ2. If the former is greater,
output is DoS. Otherwise, perform the next.
3) For the dstPort of the suspicious flow aggregate and
every srcIP that is included in the srcAS of the
aggregate, find the number of flows that are originated
from this srcIP and destined to this dstPort, regardless of
their srcPort or dstAS. Take the maximum of all such
numbers and compare this intensity value with θ3. If the
former is greater, output is Network Scan. Otherwise,
repeat these steps for the next effective suspicious flow
aggregate.
The above procedure is repeated until an attack signature
comparison is successful. Or, in the end, the anomaly type
cannot be identified and in this case the alarm is reported as
false positive.
3) Threshold Values: We highlight that the thresholds
(θi, i = 1, 2, 3) are key parameters in the root cause analysis.
In particular, the RDT algorithm [12] is used to find (θi, i =
1, 2, 3), which turned out to be eminently suitable since it
provides high classification rate in our scenario, fast and
easy to interpret, as implied by the optimality of probability
estimation by RDT [13].
In our algorithm, each anomaly is mapped as a point into a
space where anomalies are classified based on their intensities.
Under this taxonomy, we create a set of labeled instances that
consist of the attribute: intensity in number of flows, which
is mapped to one of the three anomaly classes: DoS, DDoS
and Scans. The labeled instances serve as input to the RDT
learning algorithm that outputs a tree which indicates the range
of intensities per anomaly class.
Our algorithm works as follows. It is an iterative algorithm.
For time T = 1, 2, . . . , N , the inputs are the set of unknown
anomalies at this time and the set of previously labeled
anomalies for times [1, T − 1]. The algorithm first applies the
decision tree technique on the labeled items of anomalies and
their corresponding intensity. The output is a tree DT[1,T−1] =
(Br(i, j), Class(j)), i ≤ size(DT ), j ≤ size(Br) where
each path constitutes a set of branches from the root to a
leaf. A branch j of a path i, Br(i, j), introduces an upper or
a lower bound of an anomaly intensity while a leaf of a path
i: Class(i) corresponds to a class of anomaly.
We then explore the output tree and map it into a set of
association rules to enable classification of anomalies based on
their intensity. A rule is an antecedent {Br(1, i), ...Br(n, i)}
which represents the ith path of the tree and a consequent, i.e,
a class of anomalies. Since only one attribute (anomaly inten-
sity) is adopted in the learning process, the branch Br(n, i)
from each leaf to its direct parent defines each association
rule antecedent which is, defined as comparator, i.e, ≥,≤ and
a value, i.e, a threshold of anomaly intensity. The threshold
values are then extracted by simple parsing of the set of
rule antecedents: rule antecedents which introduces an upper
bound of intensity for a class of anomaly are ignored, while
those which introduce a lower bound (comparator={≥}) are
considered. A lower bound of anomaly intensity in association
rule antecedent represents a candidate threshold. The output
threshold θi, i = 1..3 value for a given class of anomalies is
the minimum among all candidate thresholds.
IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
This section is divided into three parts. In the first part,
real data sets (chosen for our evaluation) are described. In the
second, ground truth data construction is explained and finally,
analysis on chosen parameters of SENATUS is provided.
A. Dataset
The measurement dataset used in this paper is comprised
of traffic traces collected from the GEANT network. GEANT
is a pan-Europe backbone network interconnecting European
NRENs (National Research and Educational Networks) and
provides them access to other NRENs and the Internet using
dedicated links. The traffic traces in the adopted dataset were
collected from the following four links: (1) a peering link
between the Internet and the Frankfurt router in GEANT
(Trace A); (2) a peering link between the Internet and the
Vienna router in GEANT (Trace B); (3) a peering link between
the Internet and the Amsterdam router in GEANT (Trace C);
(4) a peering link between the Internet and the Copenhagen
router in GEANT (Trace D).
The four traces1 were collected during a 18-day measure-
ment period in June – July 2011, and involve flow records
over 15-minute measurement time bins at a sampling rate of
1/1000. A flow record involves different information fields
such as source and destination IP address and AS numbers,
source and destination ports, transport protocol (TCP/UDP),
the duration of a flow (in second) and the flow size in packets
and bytes. We analyzed all the four traces and found that that
they have low rank traffic metrics and sparse abrupt variations
[14].
B. Ground-Truth Construction
Without the ground-truth data, the process of manually
inspecting anomalous time intervals (each contains hundreds
or thousands of anomalous flows) is an onerous process. To
make the construction of ground-truth feasible and tractable,
we adopt a combined method. Specifically, we run both
SENATUS (using a given heuristic) and the anomaly detection
approach that SENATUS will be compared with on the dataset
traces. For each time bin, if both approaches flag the same
anomaly type, then the anomaly is added to the ground-truth.
However, if for a particular time bin, only one of them flags
an anomaly or each flags a different type of anomaly, we
extract the following four tuple features: srcIP, dstIP, srcPort
and dstPort for each of the flagged anomalous flows and do
manual inspection in the following way. We draw a scatter plot
per each couple of traffic features in addition to a graphlet
of communication pattern [15] and check whether the label
suggested by either method matches visual inspection of the
graphs. If there is match, the alarm is added to the ground-
truth; otherwise, the alarm is considered as a false positive.
1They are available from GEANT on request.
C. SENATUS Parameters
We discuss in this subsection the impact of tuning pa-
rameters on the performance of SENATUS. The study of
this impact is based on evaluation of SENATUS’ output
with the tuning of its various parameters, predicated on the
“ground-truth” constructed in the previous section. The various
parameters associated with SENATUS, and their constraints,
are summarized in Table III.
TABLE III
SENATUS PARAMETERS
Parameter Description Constraints
α (for H1) flow size in packets small
β (for H2) flow size in bytes small
K number of senator small
λ PCP weighting parameter ≥ 2
j flow aggregation level [1, 4]
1) Traffic Filtering Heuristics H1 and H2: As previously
discussed, traffic pre-filtering tends to concentrate anomalies
in the top-K feature values, thus reducing the number of
components required for traffic histogram approximation. In
this subsection we study the range of both parameters α and
β and explain our choice of their values.
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Fig. 1. Average flow size per anomaly distribution
Related to heuristic H1, previous study (e.g. [16]) has
reported that most of the encountered anomalies (including
scans) in datasets are carried by flows with number of packets
in the range of [1, 3]. Authors of [17] also claim that most of
the detected scans are carried by flows having a packet count
number ≤ 2.
Our investigation of the flow size in the constructed ground-
truth is shown in Figure 1 (a). The figure illustrates the
distribution of the average flow size in term of packets for
the inspected anomalies in our traces. Figure 1 (a) depicts that
while most of the anomalous flows have an average size of
one packet, anomalies involving flow-size of less than or equal
3 packet are in the order of 85% of all attacks in our data set.
Related to heuristic H2, several previous studies have tried
to investigate the validity of using H2 as a heuristic to filter out
traffic carrying network abuse attacks. Authors of [16] show
that most of the detected anomalies (including scans, worms,
etc.) in their dataset are carried by small flows having a byte
count ∈ [40, 144]. Authors of [18] give narrower range of byte
count and show that over 99% of the detected DDoS attacks in
CAIDA traces have a packet size falling in the range between
40 and 60 bytes.
Our inspection of the attacks in the constructed ground-
truth shows similar results. The average flow size distribution
in terms of number of bytes is illustrated in Figure 1 (b).
Although of a long tail due to variable size of the flagged
anomalous flows, most frequent DoS/DDoS and scans in our
traces are of a small size (≤ 64 bytes). For example 52% of
the detected DOS, while 99% of the detected scans carry flows
of size 60 bytes.
In the remaining, the threshold values α and β used in our
framework are set to respectively 3 and 64.
2) The choice of K: We choose K such that it realizes an
average approximation error σK ∈ [0.01, 0.3] depending on
the measurement trace and the type of traffic under analysis.
We assume that the resultant K value under such an approx-
imation error is an acceptable “information-loss” tradeoff.
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Fig. 2. K value as a function of the approximation error
Figure 2 illustrates the range of the K value which achieves
an average approximation error in the range [0.01, 0.3] per
pre-filtering heuristic, for each of the traces. Expectedly, as
the approximation error decreases the required number of
coefficients for traffic histogram approximation exponentially
increases. The figure additionally reports that the value K
can vary from several tens to hundreds in order to achieve a
targeted approximation error, depending on the measurement
trace and the pre-filtering heuristic.
TABLE IV
APPROXIMATION ERRORS UNDER K = 20
Feature Heuristic A B C D
Srcport H1 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.02H2 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.02
Dstport H1 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.18H2 0.06 0.06 0.25 0.25
To avoid complex tuning of the K parameter and motivated
with the observation that the value of K is stable over time [6],
we choose for simplicity one value of K, i.e. K = 20, for all
traces under both heuristics. Table IV illustrates the resultant
average approximation error for the four measurement traces
using each of the proposed heuristics under K = 20.
3) The choice of the PCP Tuning Parameter: Since PCP
aims to minimize the weighted combination of the nuclear
norm and the `1-norm, one has to identify an appropriate value
of the weight parameter λ such that the matrix A captures the
maximum number of anomalies with the least false positive
rate. In PCP, parameter λ is also expressed as [7]:
λ =
C√
max{N,K} , C ∈ R (5)
where N and K are the dimension of the senators’ subspace.
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Fig. 3. Detection and false positive rates as functions of C
It has been previously shown that C = 2 is appropriate
for anomaly detection in traffic time series [4]. We base our
analysis on the previous observation and tune the parameter λ
to find an “optimal” value that achieves the “best” detection-
false positive tradeoff. To illustrate this, Figure 3 is present-
edshowing the number of detected anomalies and the false
positives as functions of the parameter C. The figure shows
that both the detection and false positive rates decrease as the
value of C increases. For example, when H2 is used, 113
anomalies are detected with 9 false positives for the value of
C = 2 while only 57 anomalies are detected with 1 false
positives for C = 2.5, both in trace A. The figure additionally
shows that while the number of false positives, when H1 is
chosen, is higher than those when H2 is used, it remains low
for all values of C. In the remaining of the evaluation we
choose the value C = 2 for both heuristics H1 and H2.
V. RESULTS
In the first part, the Apriori approach is described with
which SENATUS is compared. Then, the results are provided.
A. Apriori Approach
This approach is based on [19]. Specifically, it first uses
histogram-based detectors to identify suspicious flows and
then applies association rule mining to find and summarize
anomalous event flows. For the former, it uses Kullback-
Leibler (KL) distance, and for the latter, it makes use of the
Apriori algorithm introduced in [20].
The KL distance idea has been widely applied for anomaly
detection in previous works [10], [21], [19]. Motivated with the
basic assumption that anomalies deteriorate traffic histograms,
the KL distance identifies anomalous time intervals by mea-
suring the similarity between the current traffic histogram
and a reference histogram. More formally, given a discrete
distribution q and a reference distribution p, KL distance D is
defined as follows:
D(p||q) =
m∑
i
pilog(pi/qi). (6)
To compare with SENATUS, we apply the KL distance on
random projections (hash functions) of traffic histograms at
each of the 4-tuple features on each of the measurement
intervals. Particularly, the hash function randomly places each
traffic feature value into a set of lower-dimensional bins, which
represents a lossless compression process. In addition, the
distribution from the previous time interval is used as the
reference distribution p [19]. The KL distance value which
exceeds a predefined threshold for any time interval t serves
to detect anomalies.
After the set of anomalous time bins are identified by
the KL distance, root-cause analysis is performed, extracting
the set of candidate anomalous flows responsible for the
flagged anomalies using a flow pre-filtering algorithm [19].
This algorithm generates the meta-data that is suspicious to
contain the highest amount of anomalous flows. Such flows are
further extracted using a frequent item-set mining algorithm
(Apriori) proposed in [20].
B. Detected Anomalies per Type
Table V presents the number of anomalies per type found
by each method. The table shows that SENATUS generally
detects more anomalies (particularly network scans) than Apri-
ori. However, Apriori detects more DDoS attacks for trace C
and D. We also observe that while SENATUS using H1 or H2
detects more DoS attacks for traces A,B and D, the situation is
reversed for trace C. To understand this, we observed that most
missed DDoS attacks are mostly originating with or targeting
a random port number. In this paper, we have adopted the rule
TABLE V
ANOMALIES FOUND BY EACH APPROACH: SENATUS H1, H2 AND
APRIORI (AP)
Trace A
Anomaly type Total H1 H2 AP
DDoS 75 33 10 32
DoS 12 4 7 1
Scans 223 58 96 69
Total 310 95 113 102
Trace B
Anomaly type Total H1 H2 AP
DDoS 76 34 15 27
DoS 18 8 8 2
Scans 335 125 167 43
Total 429 167 190 72
Trace C
Anomaly type Total H1 H2 AP
DDoS 54 16 13 25
DoS 22 5 3 14
Scans 374 153 178 43
Total 450 174 194 82
Trace D
Anomaly type Total H1 H2 AP
DDoS 101 24 18 59
DoS 10 2 4 4
Scans 220 75 118 27
Total 331 101 140 90
(srcAS∧dstAS∧srcPort∧dstPort) in flagging anomalous
time bins. This rule could not be best suitable for detecting
such anomalies and new rules could be tried, but we leave this
for future investigation.
In addition, Table V shows that SENATUS using H1 finds
more DDoS attacks than using H2. This is likely due to the
fact that only one third (around 29%) of the DDoS attacks
found in the collected dataset have packets size less than 64
bytes, as indicated by Figure 1.
Furthermore, we have observed that SENATUS using H2
detects more network scans than using H1. Most of the
additionally detected network scans are small intensity SYN
scans using small packets, which are more easily spotted using
the second heuristic.
C. Performance Comparison
We now evaluate the tradeoff between detection and false
positive rates for SENATUS(H1
⋃
H2), SENATUS(H1), SEN-
ATUS(H2) and Apriori. Here, the true positive rate is defined
as the ratio of the detected number of anomalies using the
method with respect to the total detected number of anomalies
using either method. In addition, the false positive rate is
defined as the ratio of the number of false positives caused by
the method with respect to the number of detected anomalies
using this method. For ease of notation, we refer the true
positive rate of the combined set of anomalies resulting from
the union of H1 and H2, i.e. SENATUS(H1
⋃
H2), as SEN-
ATUS’ true positive rate. As in calculating the false positive
rate for SENATUS(H1
⋃
H2), if any of SENATUS(H1) and
SENATUS(H2) flags an anomaly but it is identified by visual
inspection as a false positive, then the combined number of
false positive for SENATUS(H1
⋃
H2) increments by one.
Figure 4 displays the ROC (Receiver Operator Characteris-
tics) curves that illustrate the detection rate of SENATUS as
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Fig. 4. Receiver Operator Characteristics (ROC) curves
Fig. 5. D.X: true positive rate of X, and FP.X: false positive rate of X, where
X= S for SENATUS and X= AP for Apriori.
a function of the false positive rate. The figure firstly shows
that while the detection rate of SENATUS using both H1 or
H2 is low, the detection rate of SENATUS using the union of
the two heuristics is much higher. For example, the detection
rate for SENATUS(H2), SENATUS(H1), and SENATUS (H1⋃
H2) are around 73%, around 64%, and 84% in trace B.
The figure additionally shows that the false positive rate is
low for all collected traces: it does not exceed 10% for the
four collected traces.
Interestingly, the figure highlights the findings previously
discussed: the detection rate of SENATUS using either H1 or
H2 is low compared to using the union H1
⋃
H2. Using the
union to construct the traffic population, further analyzed by
SENATUS, helps to improve the overall detection rate due to
the complimentary nature of the two heuristics.
To illustrate more directly the detection-false positive trade-
off for SENATUS (H1
⋃
H2) and Apriori, Figure 5 is
presented. Each bar graph shows either the detection or the
false positive rate for SENATUS or Apriori and for each of the
collected four traces. The figure shows that while SENATUS
experiences the best detection-false positive tradeoff, Apriori
generally exhibits the lowest detection and the highest false
positive rate among the three approaches for the four collected
traces. For example, for trace D, while the SENATUS’ detec-
tion rate is about 75% with a false positive rate about 2%, the
Apriori’s detection rate is around 40% with a false positive
rate about 5%.
VI. RELATED WORK
The problem of network anomaly detection has attracted a
lot of research effort. This section discusses the works related
to SENATUS. These works are divided into two categories:
traffic anomaly detection and root cause analysis.
A. Traffic Anomaly Detection
Significant attention has been devoted to developing various
traffic anomaly detection techniques. Earlier techniques have
mostly relied on volume metrics such as packets, bytes and
flows for analysis using time series prediction [22], sig-
nal processing [23] or machine learning [24], in order to
detect abrupt variations in traffic volume signals. In [25],
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence-based method is proposed
for detecting anomalous traffic mimicking legitimate traffic,
which is similar to the Apriori approach. In [26], Lakhina
et al proposed an approach that relies on traffic histograms
(traffic distributions) for anomaly detection, motivated by the
observation that anomalies distort the distribution of the traffic
over feature values e.g. IP addresses and ports. Unfortunately,
traffic histograms suffer from the curse of dimensionality
issue. To deal with this challenge, Lakhina et al proposed to
use entropy to summarize a traffic histogram into one value
[26].
The entropy method has been widely adopted for traffic
anomaly detection. In [27], anomaly detection in context of de-
tecting DDoS is experimented with four important information
entropy measures: Hartley entropy, Shannon entropy, Renyi’s
entropy and Generalized entropy. It has been observed that
the use of an appropriate information metric helps to magnify
the spacing between legitimate and attack traffic for both
low-rate and high-rate DDoS attack detection in real network
traffic. Recently in [28], the entropy theory and support vector
machine have been used to detect network anomaly traffic.
However, the entropy method was shown to only coarsely
model the properties of traffic histograms thus ineffective to
detect a wide range of traffic anomalies [10]. On the other
hand, other histogram-based anomaly detection approaches
have faced the challenge of traffic histogram dimensionality
reduction [21], [10], [19]. To this end, the authors of [10]
proposed to keep the well-known source and destination
ports, remove the components that remain constant, which are
associated to unused feature values, and additionally apply the
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique. In addition,
the authors of [29] proposed an aggregation strategy using
hash functions to reduce traffic histograms dimension. Their
approach was shown to be promising, providing a lossless
compression technique for traffic histogram analysis. However,
it suffers from a serious weakness: a map between the hash
function and the original histogram is required, which adds
an additional non-negligible processing overhead. In [30],
network anomalies are detected via sparsity and low rank
property. There, the goal was to construct a map of anomalies
in real time, that summarizes the network “health state” along
both the flow and time dimensions. Recently, another anomaly
detection scheme was proposed in [1], which focuses on the
anomaly detection problem for dynamic data streams through
the lens of random cut forests.
SENATUS proposes a traffic anomaly detection technique
that also relies on traffic histograms. Differently, SENATUS
deals with the curse of dimensionality using a simple low-
complexity lossy compression approach, which only extracts
the top-K components of the histograms [6].
B. Root-Cause Analysis
In the literature, very few works have tried to address
the problem of root-cause analysis of the traffic anomalies
related alarms, which typically consists on identifying the
flows involved in the anomalous behavior and pinpointing the
anomalies causing the identified behavior.
Fernandes et al [31] tried to address this problem using
a set of predefined signatures, such as traffic descriptors
describing the behavior of network attacks including DoS,
DDoS and scans. These predefined signatures involve a large
number of empirical threshold values. To circumvent the issues
with signature-based anomaly classification, in [3], manually
identified anomalies were projected on a 22-coordinate feature
space to classify new anomalous behavior through hierarchical
clustering. However, if a new behavior, which is different from
the built-in anomalies, is encountered, the used methodology
is unable to classify or characterize the considered unknown
anomaly. To deal with this challenge, the authors of [32]
have proposed an unsupervised algorithm which combines the
notions of Sub-Space Clustering and Evidence Accumulation
clustering on 36 two-dimensional feature subspace. This ap-
proach may suffer from scalability issues when implemented
on high speed links in a backbone network. Moreover, the
authors of [33] proposed a data mining approach to classify
detected anomalous flows. This approach focuses on finding
flows, in the data set, sharing feature values that appear fre-
quently together and the frequency is greater than a predefined
threshold called the minimum support. While it was proven to
be efficient to classify a wide class of anomalies, the minimum
support threshold is generally difficult to choose [33]. In
[34], a framework is proposed, called as ATLANTIC, which
combines the use of information theory to calculate deviations
in the entropy of flow tables and a range of machine learning
algorithms to classify traffic flows. In addition, authors of [35]
proposed a technique for root cause analysis in component-
based systems and their approach focuses at application-level
anomaly correlation.
SENATUS, on the other hand, relies on a linear time
algorithm where the threshold values are automatically identi-
fied based on a machine learning classification technique, the
decision tree method (Random Tree) [8] only using four-tuple
features: srcIP, dstIP, srcPort and dstPort.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose SENATUS, a novel approach for
traffic anomaly detection and root-cause analysis. In particular,
it conducts root cause analysis jointly with anomaly detection.
In addition to the novel joint treatment, the specific novelty and
contribution of SENATUS are as follows. (1) First, instead of
performing analysis directly on the original traffic histogram
which suffers from the curse of dimensionality, we propose to
use approximate traffic histograms with much reduced dimen-
sionality as inputs to the analysis. Conceptually, this forms
the core of the SENATUS election stage. (2) Second, at the
SENATUS voting stage, we propose to use PCP to detect time
bins with abrupt changes in the time series of each selected
traffic feature value. Detected abrupt variations serve as votes
which flag if a time bin is anomalous using a defined decision
rule. (3) At the final decision stage, we further conduct root-
cause analysis on each anomalous time bin. We propose to
adopt a machine learning-based technique for this purpose.
(4) For the GEANT measurement dataset of four 18 day-long
traces, we evaluate SENATUS and compare with a well-known
traffic histogram-based anomaly detector, Apriori. We found
that SENATUS uncovers a high number of anomalies that
Apriori does not, in addition to SENATUS’ better performance
in diagnosing network scans and DoS/DDoS for the GEANT
dataset. This makes SENATUS an appealing approach for
joint traffic anomaly detection and root-cause analysis, well
complimenting the Apriori approach.
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